Check The Timestamps

I am fascinated by the new post on the Plame investigation by Jeralyn Merritt of TalkLeft.

However, I have a response so odd I can scarcely imagine how to present it without invoking the notion that someone at the Wall Street Journal, or somewhere, needs to see their opth eye doctor.  Well, here we go, from Jeralyn:

Wednesday :: October 12, 2005

Fitzgerald Widening His Probe

So, the latest: The Wall Street Journal reports today that Fitzgerald is widening his probe. (Hopefully the Journal will make this a free link tomorrow. If so, I'll update with it.)

There are signs that prosecutors now are looking into contacts between administration officials and journalists that took place much earlier than previously thought. Earlier conversations are potentially significant, because that suggests the special prosecutor leading the investigation is exploring whether there was an effort within the administration at an early stage to develop and disseminate confidential information to the press that could undercut former Ambassador Joseph Wilson and his wife, Central Intelligence Agency official Valerie Plame.

Lawyers familiar with the investigation believe that at least part of the outcome likely hangs on the inner workings of what has been dubbed the White House Iraq Group. Formed in August 2002, the group, which included Messrs. Rove and Libby, worked on setting strategy for selling the war in Iraq to the public in the months leading up to the March 2003 invasion. The group likely would have played a significant role in responding to Mr. Wilson's claims.

Raw Story reports similar news.

And so they do, if one follows the link.

Well, here is my theory - someone needs to check some timestamps, and since the WSJ story is behind a firewall, I can't.

Why do I say that?  Because the Washington Post had substantively the same story exactly two years ago on Oct 12, 2003.  I think the WSJ may have carried recycling a bit too far.  [No, they are serious - here is a WSJ link.  Snark continues below.]

Or put another way, is the Wall Street Journal kidding?  Based on that excerpt, they are telling us today what the WaPo told us quite a while ago, and which was supported by the "One x Two x Six" reporting from the NY Times the following February.

And by the time of the release of the SSCI Report on pre-war intelligence in July 2004, it was obvious that the Wilson story did not start on July 6, 2003.  Or, as another example, we have had plenty of reporting that Fitzgerald is interested in an INR memo from June 10, including important news from the WSJ.

Something is awry here.  Well, get out the snark-pens - either the Wall Street Journal and Raw Story have lost it, or I have.

But my (current and flexible) position - don't get too far out on that WSJ / Raw Story lead.

UPDATE:  OK, let's take the "broader investigation" idea seriously.  Here is my "Emerging Case Against Karl Rove" from July 21, which does not appear to have been overtaken by events; here is the recent notion that Fitzgerald intends to criminalize the plan to leak info to the press about the Niger trip itself, *not* just Wilson's wife.

MORE:  Using the WSJ search function, I see that their new story really is from Oct 12, 2005.  So let's focus on this, from the excerpt:

...an effort within the administration at an early stage to develop and disseminate confidential information to the press that could undercut former Ambassador Joseph Wilson and his wife, Central Intelligence Agency official Valerie Plame.

I have been advised that in his book, Joe Wilson asserts that the White House began a work-up on him in March 2003.  However, the normal timeline is that he first came to the attention of the State Dept. and the White House after the Kristof column on May 6 and the Pincus story on June 12.  And don't overlook Condi Rice's awkward "Maybe someone knew in the bowels of the agency" moment on the June 8 "Meet The Press".  (Or is it "This Week With George Stepanapoulos"?.  Let's note the Kristof correction - I have been citing a June 8 Meet The Press appearance forever.  Of course, all I have on my side is Tim Russert, who said this on Sept 28, 2003:

MR. RUSSERT: That was in January. And in June—June 8—you were on MEET THE PRESS; I asked you about that, and this was your response.
       (Videotape, June 8, 2003):

DR. RICE: The president quoted a British paper. We did not know at the time, no one knew at the time in our circles—maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our circles knew—that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery. Of course, it was information that was mistaken.
       (End videotape)).

And end that parenthetical sidebar.  Is Kristof confused, or is it Russert with the memory problem?

Sorry, I digressed.  Anyway, if the WSJ is going back in time, how much further back are they going?  Set the story free!

As a bonus, note the rebuttal to Condi in the Jun 12, 2003 Left Coaster link, and compare those leaks to the July 2004 SSCI report.  Fascinating.  It is posted after the break.  One point - it gives a sense of the information push and push back with which the Admin was dealing.  One might argue that the senior CIA leakers cited below were not fully accurate.

From the AP (Alternative link):

A senior CIA official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said the intelligence agency informed the White House on March 9, 2002 - 10 months before Bush's nationally televised speech - that an agency source who had traveled to Niger couldn't confirm European intelligence reports that Iraq was attempting to buy uranium from the West African country.

Despite the CIA's misgivings, Bush said in his State of the Union address: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium in Africa."

Three senior administration officials said Vice President Dick Cheney and some officials on the National Security Council staff and at the Pentagon ignored the CIA's reservations and argued that the president and others should include the allegation in their case against Saddam.

The claim later turned out to be based on crude forgeries that an African diplomat had sold to Italian intelligence officials. The CIA's March 2002 warning about Iraq's alleged uranium-shopping expedition in Niger was sent to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Justice Department and the FBI the same day it went to the White House, the senior CIA official said.

In the months before Bush's State of the Union speech, the senior CIA official said, agency officials also told the State Department, National Security Council staffers and members of Congress that they doubted that Iraq had been trying to buy uranium from Niger.

One senior administration official, also speaking on the condition of anonymity because the intelligence reports remain classified, said the CIA's doubts were well known and widely shared throughout the government before Bush's speech.

Really?  From the SSCI (53 of the .pdf):

(U) The intelligence report based on the former ambassador's trip was disseminated on March 8, 2002. The report did not identify the former ambassador by name or as a former ambassador, but described him as "a contact with excellent access who does not have an established reporting record."

...The intelligence report indicated that former Nigerien Prime Minister Ibrahim
Mayaki was unaware of any contracts that had been signed between Niger and any rogue states for the sale of yellowcake while he was Prime Minister (1997-1999) or Foreign Minister (1996- 1997). Mayaki said that if there had been any such contract during his tenure, he would have been aware of it. Mayaki said, however, that in June 1999, |xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx| businessman, approached him and insisted that Mayaki meet with an Iraqi delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations" between Niger and Iraq. The intelligence report said that Mayaki interpreted "expanding commercial relations" to mean that the delegation wanted to discuss uranium yellowcake sales. The intelligence report also said that "although the meeting took place, Mayaki let the matter drop due to the UN sanctions on Iraq."

The intelligence report also said that Niger's former Minister for Energy and
Mines xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Mai Manga, stated that there were no sales outside of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) channels since the mid- 1980s. He knew of no contracts signed between Niger and any rogue states for the sale of uranium. He said that an Iranian delegation was interested in purchasing 400 tons of yellowcake from Niger in 1998, but said that no contract was ever signed with Iran. Mai Manga also described how the French mining consortium controls Nigerien uranium mining and keeps the uranium very tightly controlled from the time it is mined until the time it is loaded onto ships in Benin for transport overseas. Mai Manga believed it would be difficult, if not impossible, to arrange a special shipment of uranium to a pariah state given these controls.

[Big Skip]

(U) IC analysts had a fairly consistent response to the intelligence report based on the former ambassador's trip in that no one believed it added a great deal of new information to the Iraq-Niger uranium story. An INR analyst said when he saw the report he believed that it corroborated the INR's position, but said that the "report could be read in different ways." He said the report was credible, but did not give it a lot of attention because he was busy with other things.

(U) DIA and CIA analysts said that when they saw the intelligence report they did not believe that it supplied much new information and did not think that it clarified the story on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. They did not find Nigerien denials that they had discussed uranium sales with Iraq as very surprising because they had no expectation that Niger would admit to such an agreement if it did exist. The analysts did, however, find it interesting that the former Nigerien Prime Minister said an Iraqi delegation had visited Niger for what he believed was to discuss uranium sales.

(U) Because CIA analysts did not believe that the report added any new information to clarify the issue, they did not use the report to produce any further analytical products or highlight the report for policymakers. For the same reason, CIA's briefer did not brief the Vice President on the report, despite the Vice President's previous questions about the issue.

Comments

[Jeff]

TM - I think the significant thing about the WSJ article is not the -- as you say, well known -- fact that investigators are looking back to June, but the conjoined suggestions that Fitzgerald might be pursuing a wider conspiracy and that the investigation likely hangs on the inner workings of the WHIG. Again, this is not exactly news in and of itself -- it has been a favorite theory on the left, based in part on the fact that part of Fitzgerald's opening subpoenas back in early 2004 was for records from the WHIG (although, IIRC, they were limited to the fateful week in July, though I could be wrong). So the question is, does the WSJ have new information, or not, on the focus on the WHIG in the investigation, and which category do guesses from lawyers fall into?

[kim]

My guess is that it only appears that Fitz is widening his investigation because of the tactical moves being made now. I do assume close approach to omniscience by Fitz, but that he would roll antegrade is no surprise.

This is gonna be one big ball of twine when he's done. Right now the world's largest ball of twine is out in the Land of Ahs.
================================================

[kim]

My perspective may be off. Maybe he is rolling retrograde. One thing for sure, that ol' man river, he just keep rollin', he keeps on rollin', he keeps on rollin', along.
=================================================

[pollyusa]

I'd have to say the WSJ's really, really big scoop was when they reported their knowledge of the exsistence of the classified State Department Memo (INR Memo) way back in October 2003.

I wonder who leaked to David Cloud about the contents of INR memo? That would be leaking classified information.

lets see

according to two people familiar with the memo.

according to current and former government officials familiar with the meeting at the CIA's Virginia headquarters

According to current and former officials familiar with the memo

Other officials with knowledge of the memo

Officials familiar with the early 2002 meeting at CIA headquarters

quite a crowd.

Since we're thinking about timestamps, I would hazard a guess that the Senate investigation that produced the SSCI report may have been hearing testimony regarding the 2/02 meeting and the memo sometime in October 2003.

[Jeff]

One might argue that the senior CIA leakers cited below were not fully accurate.

That old AP report is fascinating. But -- the issue of March 8 v. March 9 aside -- I'd like to see the argument that the senior CIA leakers were not fully accurate. I'm not seeing any inconsistency between what the article says and what the SSCI. There is a very different emphasis, of course -- but, as I've been arguing for a while now, the whole interpretive framework of the SSCI report is designed to mislead on some crucial questions.

I'll give you one very significant example that I take it you are highlighting: the question of whether Cheney's office ever saw the intelligence report based on Wilson's trip. We don't know the answer to that, but I defy you to tell me where in the SSCI it says Cheney's people did not see it, though I will grant (it's my point) that the SSCI seeks to leave the impression that it did not. All the SSCI says is "CIA's briefer did not brief the Vice President on the report." The AP article, presumably referring to the intelligence report, says that the CIA informed the White House in March, along with the DIA, the Joint Chiefs, the Justice Dept. and the FBI. There are other ways to inform those folks besides briefing them. For instance, the report could be disseminated in the normal and wide channels that would include all of those destinations. Guess what? It was, per Tenet's famous July 11 2003 statement. It would also be interesting to know whether someone else briefed Cheney on the report, say someone with a funny nickname. But even if not, the basic question is, did the VP's office become cognizant of the report based on Wilson's trip? The SSCI strains to suggest the answer is no, but we do not know that.

Now, if your problem with the CIA's leaks to the AP in that story is that it makes it sound like the CIA was more doubtful about the Niger reports than it was, i would suggest the emphasis in the story is more consistent with what else we know than the SSCI report is. (You'll notice I see no warrant for taking the SSCI report as gospel, rather than as yet another set of interpretations and arguments about what happened.) True, the CIA obviously was not of one mind. But isn't it just possible that it is the SSCI that is really misleading? Insofar as it makes it sound like CIA analysts per se were not impressed by the report. Do we know this? No we don't, and perhaps it was just a couple of them, a couple who were pushing the story, and/or who knew that Cheney's office didn't want to know what they didn't want to hear. Again, go back and look at Tenet's statement. It contains a lot on the CIA's doubts and the reiteration of them to other parts of the administration.

Finally, it's worth noting that the AP report cites three senior administration officials on some of this stuff. That likely goes beyond CIA sources.

You are of course right that parts of the administration were dealing with a push from other parts and from parts of the CIA. Yes, and? There is nothing I see to suggest that any (or any material - which day in March doesn't count) part of the push was wrong.

So I'd like to see the argument.

[Al]

"it was obvious that the Wilson story did not start on July 6, 2004."

You mean July 6, 2003?

[Al]

Also, TM, I guess the issue is that the Miller (and other) subpoenas only reference the July 6 - July 12 time period. Why would Fitz have limited his inquiry that way unless he really WASN'T looking into what happened in June?

But what is new is that he's changed his mind and now IS asking about things that were prior to the period in his original subpoenas.

[pollyusa]

Jeff,

The SSCI report is a fascinating document. In the main sections the report seems to let everyone get their two cents on the record, which is where the contradictions come in.

It's the ultimate outing of the in-fighting.

I really wish there was an html version of the report.

[MaidMarion]

Does anyone remember reading online about the social encounter Bill Clinton had with "his friend" Tony Blair, while over in Europe in 2003? I believe Clinton's trip was very soon after the successful invasion of Iraq...and I believe it was the first the two had met since Clinton left office.

It was reported that Clinton told Blair that he was sorry Blair had supported Bush in Iraq...'cause some dirty stuff was coming down the pike which may hurt Blair but that he, Clinton, couldn't protect Blair from the attacks.

I thought this was curious, so was keeping a lookout for stuff hitting the fan.

Soon thereafter, the press here started reporting about the Niger trip in America but the bigger coverage was on Blair as he was being attacked for having "sexed up" Iraq's WMD. It was about two months or so later that the Brit defense analyst committed suicide...which was right about the time of Novak's article. Up until Novak's article, more media/press attention was being paid to the attack on Blair, it seemed to me.

I wish I had access to Lexus-Nexus so I could find the internet article and get the date of Clinton's meeting with Blair.

[John Gillnitz]

WSJ has it up free:
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB112907415441266084-VDsI1ez92Qlr0_XPP5IbwfiUKHI_20051111.html?mod=blogs

[Wolfman]

I have wondered why the press has always focused on what happened after Wilson's NYT article. The earlier (5/6/03) Kristoff article had to catch someone's attention at the WH and CIA.

In it, Kristoff wrote: In February 2002, according to someone present at the meetings, that envoy reported to the C.I.A. and State Department that the information was unequivocally wrong and that the documents had been forged. The envoy reported, for example, that a Niger minister whose signature was on one of the documents had in fact been out of office for more than a decade. . . . The envoy's debunking of the forgery was passed around the administration and seemed to be accepted — except that President Bush and the State Department kept citing it anyway.

The forged documents were the "smoking gun" that really called Bush's State of the Union comments into question.

Did the WH learn they were forged before or after the speech? Kristoff's article clearly claims before. The WH still maintains it did not learn until later.

The WH had to be very interested in the Kristoff article. Who provided the information to Kristoff (BTW, we now know it was Wilson)? If Kristoff's reporting was true, why didn't that information make it to the WH (some probably believe it did)? Was someone at the CIA trying to sabotage the case for war in Iraq?

I'd be shocked if the WH wasn't trying to learn everything it could about the Kristoff article. Among other things, that would mean checking with potentially helpful media figures (Miller?) since the "leak" appeared in the media.

[eriposte]

Tom,

The SSCI report significantly whitewashed the true state of affairs regarding the doubts of the CIA and what was known after Wilson's trip.

It's too much detail to provide the rebuttal here, but here are a couple of key links.

1. A review of the real facts (minus the spin) on Wilson's trip's findings:
http://www.theleftcoaster.com/archives/004982.php

2. A comprehensive summary page on the real findings of the SSCI report on the uranium from Africa issue, with links to detailed explanations:
http://www.theleftcoaster.com/archives/005047.php

3. A more comprehensive resource page with links - here:
http://www.theleftcoaster.com/archives/005211.php

Unless you mine the *raw data* in the SSCI report and the associated facts available from media coverage from that time period, it is easy to get carried away by the spin.

[TM]

I really wish there was an html version of the [SSCI] report

Polly - your merest wish is our command, sometimes.

Check the links on the right column of my blog, or here - it is the modified .pdf file of the SSCI, text searchable and copy-able.

Some MIT guys put it up way back when IIRC.

Unrelated, but in a sign of mounting desperation, I revisted the argument that Jpw Wilosn outed himself.

Cliff May does a poor job; my argument would be that, once Wilson went public as a CIA consultant, someone was likely to wonder about his wife. And her Brewster-Jennings cover would not hold up to any real scrutiny.

More on that here - apparently, Brewster-Jennings was set up after she came home following the Aldrich Ames debacle. So that was not even her cover company when she was active.

(The Brewstwer-Jennings article is from Oct 2003, Boston Globe, timeline).

[Jeff]

my argument would be that, once Wilson went public as a CIA consultant, someone was likely to wonder about his wife.

Huh? Why would someone wonder about his wife? And when, on your view, did Wilson go public as a CIA consultant?

[TM]

Ok, eriposte suggests I probe the ostensibly bipartisan SSCI report for the real truth, since all the Dems and their staffers lay down to cover Bush's lies. Hmm.

As an aside, I am wondering if this is the eriposte associated with the website of the same name? I thought you did a good job for your side on the Swift Boat debacle (I happen to think Cecil Turner and others did a better job for their side, but that was last year's tussle...)

Anyway, at he Left Coaster I am choking in about the sixth paragraph of the third section, just after we sjkip the intro and get to the analysis:

The dead giveaway among the inconsistencies is July 7, 2000 incorrectly being stated as a "Wednesday" rather than a Friday [on a document reported as authentic]. You want to see a document with "Wednesday, July 7, 2000" associated with an alleged Iraq-Niger sales agreement? It's right here, among the full list of forged Niger documents (scroll down to "ANNEX 1").

You tell me the odds of two supposedly independent sets of documents, describing the same fake deal, having the exact same date error (among other things), and I'll tell you the odds of an elephant hanging off the edge of a cliff using just its tail.

His point - the SSCI referred to supposedly *authentic* docs with the same date error as known forgeries, thereby proving that the "authentic" docs were fake.

My LOL response - if I had in my possession docs that really were authentic, I would use them as a template for forgeries.

And if the authentic docs had a date error, well, I might repeat that.

In which case, the odds of two seemingly coincidental date errors look a lot better. Maybe someone with accces to the first set ginned up some forgeries, too - who knows?

At this early point, my confidence collapsed - if the Left Coaster wants to assume all the Dems went to sleep, and that every oddity is explained in the wildest way, well - have fun.

[BR]

Hee, I think Fitzgerald already widened the investigation in week one, if not day one. The MSM is only now catching up...sort of. They caught a whiff of it two years ago, and now again. But they keep reporting the snippets they get from lawyers representing the various reporters who testified to the GJ, adding their interpretations of that data. So their reporting becomes tainted by their own wishful thinking suppositions. That's why it's so difficult to decode the articles. Not to speak of the myriad misleading descriptions of their sources. I saw one article a while ago containing three different descriptions for the same anonymous source. Fantastic analyzing you're doing, TM, wading through all of the smoke and mirrors.

If this is really going where I think it is, I hope there is some preparation to ease the press into it, otherwise the shock may be overwhelming to them.

[Cecil Turner]

I'm not seeing any inconsistency between what the article says and what the SSCI.

Here are three inconsistencies:

• Wilson's trip proved nothing (and in fact most analysts thought it bolstered the claim)
• It wasn't briefed to the Administration
• The 16 words were not based on the forgeries

the whole interpretive framework of the SSCI report is designed to mislead on some crucial questions.

The SSCI report flatly contradicts Wilson's major points. But I don't think the credibility problem is in the report.

[Jim E.]

Looks like Kevin Drum is plagiarizing TM. He, too, notes that FitzGerald has had his sights on WHIG for a long time. Apparently the Wall St Journal only noticed now.

[eriposte]

TM,

The argument you extracted is not the only evidence I offered, even though the argument about the date is strong enough. There is a mass of additional evidence available in the SSCI report that independently validates many of the inferences (some of which is captured in the very same post).

Unfortunately, I made the assumption that you are a disinterested purveyor of facts. I realize I have been proven wrong on that count.

Regards.

[BR]

Looks like someone up higher in the thread didn't end off their italics. Wonder what will happen if I add it here... Testing...

[clarice]

Here is an html version of the SCCI report--bookmark it--so you don't have to deal with that f'ing pdr version. http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2004_rpt/iraq-wmd-intell_chapter2-b.htm

[TM]

it was obvious that the Wilson story did not start on July 6, 2004."

Well, that *was* pretty obvious...

In addition to SpellCheck, I need to install DateCheck and BrainCheck.

[Jeff]

cecil - You know, you know a lot about this stuff, and you make some good points. But frankly you really way too much on evocations of logic and especially the principle of parsimony. When i spoke of inconsistencies, I was speaking of inconsistencies of facts, as opposed to the interpretation put on those facts. The first inconsistency you cite is the interpretive spin put on by the SSCI. Nothing in the underlying facts to that judgment they make contradicts the AP report, to say nothing of Tenet's July 11 statement. I challenge you to show me facts, facts, facts that are inconsistent.

You next say, it wasn't briefed to the administration. First off, all we know is that the CIA briefer did not brief it. But beyond that, and I thought I was pretty clear on this, the issue is not just whether it was briefed or not. The issue is whether the White House, and more specifically Cheney's office, learned of the report. I challenge you to find me the place in the SSCI where it is denied that the administration had the report distributed widely and in the normal channels, as Tenet's statement affirmed, and I challenge you more speficially to find any facts in the SSCI that deny that it was circulated to the White House, the DIA, the Justice Department and the FBI, as the AP article cites sources stating. Now, last you say that the SSCI says that the 16 words were not based on the forgeries. Could you give me a cite -- not that I don't believe you, I just want to see what is actually claimed -- and then we can start looking at the actual facts. Is the claim that they were not based exclusively on the forgeries, or not at all? And if you are going to play around with dates as to when the forgeries became available, I'm happy to play that game -- because I think we will find that all the relevant intel reports go back to the same discredited info as the forgeries. Or are you talking about other countries in Africa? Then we can do that part as well, if you want to talk about D Congo, and then we can go to the Butler report, which offers just about no substantiation for any of that business.

So again, the SSCI does go out of its way, in its conclusions, to continue the pushback against Wilson. But if we look at facts, and then at their selective presentation, and then at the unwarranted conclusions drawn on their basis, then I think a different picture emerges from the one you are pushing. And after all, that AP piece doesn't seem to rely much if at all on Wilson, but rather on senior CIA sources as well as (apparently) other administration officials.

[TM]

Unfortunately, I made the assumption that you are a disinterested purveyor of facts.

A dangerous assumption. That said, in the future be sure to offer people the Kool-aid where they can see it - some of those conspiracy theories go down hard on an empty stomach.

From Jeff, on my Wilson Auto-outing theory:

Huh? Why would someone wonder about his wife?

(a) Because John LeCarre often has husband-wife spy teams.

(b) See "Mounting Desperation", above.

Look, all I know is what I see in B movies - I have never done counter-espionage.

But if a retired Ambassador, now a consultant, announced in the NY Times that he undertook a trip for the CIA, I *might* bestir myself to learn a bit more about him, including a bit more about the wife and kids.

And the wife would not hold up to much of a look. Which Wilson should have (and probably did) know.

Well, that is the thought. I never took May seriously, because legally, I think the answer is, so what? I don't think a hypothetical defense of "Her cover was weak" would cut it in court.

But in the court of public opinion, who knows?

This would be perfect for Powerline. No fair asking what I mean by that - I've already said too much.

[pollyusa]

clarice and TM

Thank you, thank you, thank you for the html copy of the SSCI report.

[Cecil Turner]

The argument you extracted is not the only evidence I offered . . .

Unfortunately, it was the strongest evidence--the others, well . . . weren't. This one tells us Joe Wilson didn't find anything (uh, no kidding); and this one tells us: "The Senate Report establishes without any doubt that Bush's SOTU claim was based on intel from Niger." Funny then, the SOTU mention of British Intelligence, and equally perplexing is the conclusion of the Butler Report:

We conclude that, on the basis of the intelligence assessments at the time, covering both Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the Government’s dossier, and by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, were well-founded.

Unfortunately, I made the assumption that you are a disinterested purveyor of facts.

Let's see. One set of assertions backed up by links from the no-doubt disinterested left coaster, followed by an ad hominem. Persuasive.

[pollyusa]

TM

You and Rove

From Cooper's story ""What I Told The Grand Jury"

I have a distinct memory of Rove ending the call by saying, "I've already said too much."
Time

This would be perfect for Powerline. No fair asking what I mean by that - I've already said too much.
TM

heh

[clarice]

Once again the June 25 conversation is NOT about the nothingburger Wilson/Plame fake "outing". It is about what Miller told him that is the subject of the 2d part of the subpoena to her (Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium). She didn't produce her notebook earlier because the coversation occurred earlier than July 6 which was the dte specified (I think erroneously) in the subpoena. July 6-13 relates to the first part of her subpoena, the nonsensical "leak" inquiry.

[Jerkweed]

How come conservatives go apeshit when Justice Kennedy cites foreign caselaw in his opinion, but have no problem with the President citing British intelligence as a reason to take the country to war?

[Jeff]

cecil - There you go again, citing conclusions from the Butler report. If you look at the underlying facts in the Butler report, they don't support that conclusion. Among other things, all the evidence on Niger in the Butler report appears to go back to the same source as the forgeries. Or at least, everything we know of does, and the British have illegally refused to turn over what else they've purportedly got to the IAEA, and Occam's razor dictates that the simplest explanation is that they don't have anything of substance, right?

[Cecil Turner]

"The first inconsistency you cite is the interpretive spin put on by the SSCI."

The interpretation was provided by CIA analysts . . . which is their job. A quick look at the NIE shows the CIA party line was to buy off on the Niger claims (including the forged documents). Note the INR "alternative view" is included as a minority opinion.

The issue is whether the White House, and more specifically Cheney's office, learned of the report.

I doubt it, since decisionmakers are normally provided interpreted and refined "intelligence" rather than raw "data." But if they had, they'd have learned most analysts thought it supported the uranium from Niger claims. Which doesn't really make the case, does it?

Now, last you say that the SSCI says that the 16 words were not based on the forgeries.

The SSCI is not a good reference for the British Intelligence basis for the 16 words (and actually the SSCI--and all US intelligence--tends to support the forgeries as the main source). If that's your point, conceded. However, TM's original contention was "not fully accurate," and for that particular point, Butler is the prime reference (and they have consistently cited humint sources other than the forgeries).

[Jeff]

clarice - We know that the June 23 conversation bore on Joe Wilson in some way. Also, by all reports it appears to be the case that Fitzgerald dropped the second part of the subpoena, the part on Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium, in agreeing to let Judy out of jail. I do think one of the things many of the righties and many of the lefties in these parts can agree on is that we'd like to see that topic investigated with greater thoroughness - by the media, by independent investigators - than it has been so far. We may have different ideas of where such an investigation would lead. But we've got consensus on getting going. Maybe we should all lobby the FBI to get moving on its alleged investigation into the forgeries, their circulation and the whys of that.

[clarice]

cecil, if the forgeries were so patent, why did the CIA hand them over to the IAEA without indicating their disbelief in them as apparently they did in February of 2003?

[JayDee]

Cecil says "The Senate Report establishes without any doubt that Bush's SOTU claim was based on intel from Niger and leaves off (and specifically based on the contents from the forged Niger documents)

Your Butler report link doesn't work, but how many ways can you spin the same set of forged docs?

The karma of this story is so satisfying. If the country finally gets a glimpse into the intelligence frauds perpetrated by WHIG, maybe we can finally begin to emerge from this long national nightmare.

[clarice]

Any time someone links karma to intelligence I get the heeby jeebies..%^).

The idea that the Administration deliberately relied on forged documents or was so credulous that they--unlike the grand Wizard Wilson--failed to catch it is absurd.

[cathyf]

Mai Manga also described how the French mining consortium controls Nigerien uranium mining and keeps the uranium very tightly controlled from the time it is mined until the time it is loaded onto ships in Benin for transport overseas. Mai Manga believed it would be difficult, if not impossible, to arrange a special shipment of uranium to a pariah state given these controls.

I know it's off-topic a bit, but I was wondering if anybody got a chuckle out of this part like I did. Sure, the sanctions regime was so effective. Ok, there's that pesky little detail that it didn't stop Saddam from stealing, oh what's the latest estimate? $20 billion. And of course it's inconceivable that in a poverty-stricken 3rd-world country if somebody dangled lots of cash he couldn't get something for his money. But the part about the French is surely the kicker. The French who played Monica Lewinsky to Saddam's Bill Clinton for all those years. Sure, they were going to protect the world from Saddam.

Yeah, right.

cathy :-)

[Jeff]

cecil - It's very hard to tell what we're looking at with those bare bones excerpts from the NIE, which is especially important because the key judgments glossed over a number of issues in the actual body of the document, as Woodward documents pretty convincingly in Plan of Attack, including having to do with the CIA's own internal dissensus. What's more, as Tenet emphasized in his statement of July 11 2003, the African uranium issue was left out of the Key Judgments' reasons (six were given) for judging that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. What's more, Tenet also emphasizes other doubts expressed about efforts to acquire uranium in Africa. What we know from the SSCI is that some CIA analysts had a particular take. Is that exhaustive? Was there any disagreement? We don't learn, though there is reason to suspect the answer to the last question is yes. Your point here does raise another important issue, though. Given that some in the CIA lined up with Cheney et al, and knew what they wanted to hear, we can't be sure that the intelligence report based on Wilson's trip accurately reported what Wilson learned and passed on to the CIA. Indeed, the SSCI gives reason to think the reporting was not accurate, given at least the conflicting depictions of the business about Iraq and Niger potentially (though never actually) broaching discussion of trade.

The issue is whether the White House, and more specifically Cheney's office, learned of the report.

I doubt it, since decisionmakers are normally provided interpreted and refined "intelligence" rather than raw "data." But if they had, they'd have learned most analysts thought it supported the uranium from Niger claims. Which doesn't really make the case, does it?

But we know as a matter of fact that the intelligence report based on Wilson's trip was given a normal and wide distribution. To me, this certainly sounds like it tracks what is claimed in the AP article. Or are you saying all those senior intelligence officials and the three senior administration officials cited in the AP article on various related matters were just lying? We also still don't know that most analysts thought the report supported the uranium from Niger claims, though you are right that those allied with Cheney were pushing that idea pretty clearly even at the time.

As for the Butler report, I'll just say again that its conclusions are not supported by the data they are based on, as best as we can tell, and the rest the British are illegally withholding from the IAEA.

Finally, if you actually look at Tenet's statement of July 11 2003, its claim track, to a significant degree, the position of the CIA laid out in the AP article. The CIA did not brief Congress on the uranium claim when Tenet et al briefed hundreds of members on Iraq in the fall of 2002. The CIA expressed reservations to the British in fall of 2002 on including acquisition attempts by Iraq in Africa (n.b not just Niger) in the unclassified dossier, as senior intelligence officials went on to clarify before Senate committees. The CIA also left out the issue in an October White Paper, because it was not fundamental, but also because they had questions about some of the reporting. Similarly, it was left out of lots of public speeches. Finally, the CIA did take issue with some draft formulations of the SOTU, but biffed its final responsibility by falling back on the technicality about citing the British. (I'll note that even on its face the claim is inaccurate, since the British had not learned about etcetc, since you can't learn something that is not the case. If Bush had just said, "The British have claimed . . .", he would have been fine. But of course that is not very convincing, is it?)

[clarice]

Yeah right! And those French officials (like the Ambassador to the UN SEC and then aide to Annan arrested yesterday in connection with the OFF scandal) could surely be trusted to keep accurate records.

It's impossible to keep a straight face reading how an idiot liar got so far in hoodwinking the mandarins of Fleet Street .

[Jeff]

clarice says, " . . . an idiot liar . . ."

Oh yes, there's no ad hominem or snark from you, clarice. Never.

[clarice]

Not to other posters.

And if someone deserves to be more disparaged as a self-promoting, stupid liar than Wilson, I can't imagine who that would be.

Every word he has ever said drips with self promotion and cant.

[kim]

Jeff since when must British Intelligence spill their sources to the IAEA?

Jay Dee, are you reading carefully? So far I see intelligence frauds from Joe Wilson and the CIA being awfully coy about Yellow Cake and Africa and Joe Wilson. And journalists unable to report.

Clarice, very good. Did the CIA know the Yelow Cake Papers were forgeries, and when did they know it? Ditto Joe.
==================================

[kim]

cathy f, I am actually ignorant, but I've heard that uranium ore(not yellow cake, which is partly refined) is fairly easy to lay your hands on in Africa. The refining process to yellow cake is easy. This really is not germane to this discussion, but as Jay Rosen might put it, it shimmers. Maybe it glows.
================================================

[JayDee]

The idea that the Administration deliberately relied on forged documents or was so credulous that they--unlike the grand Wizard Wilson--failed to catch it is absurd.

Speak for yourself. Absurd? This is the admin that gave us phony terror alerts throughout the election campaign - and another just this weekend to coincide with Bush's latest 'be very afraid' speech. They've just produced a laughably bogus "letter from al Zaquari" that reads like it was written by PNAC itself. You can believe what you wish, but I'm feeling very confident at the moment, considering the truth seeker (and soon teller) in this instance is Pat Fitzgerald and not Buckethead.

[Wolfman]

Did the CIA know the Yelow Cake Papers were forgeries, and when did they know it?

Wilson, through his reported leak to Kristoff repeated in Kristoff's May 6, 2003 op-ed, claimed that the CIA and the State Department knew about the forged documents when he reported about his trip to Niger in November 2002.

[Jeff]

Jeff since when must British Intelligence spill their sources to the IAEA?

I didn't say anything about spilling sources. UN resolutions bind governments to submit to the IAEA any information concerning Iraqi illegal weapons. To the best of my knowledge, the British continue to refuse to do this.

[BR]

Wolfman, wasn't it as early as Feb 02 during his briefing before the trip?

Later on, the French forged docs from "Giacomo" surfaced via Italian journalist Burba in Sept. 02. But there are many, many links of articles and interviews in which Wilson describes knowing of the forgeries before his trip. Later, when caught on his blooper in the SSCI hearings, he began backtracking.

[BR]

Hi Kim, did you my msg to you over in a previous thread?

[kim]

Ah yes, Buckhead. We should have Buckhead festivals on his anniversary in the blogosphere.

Wolfman, that's Joe you've sourced to.

Jeff, thanks, that is useful info. Those Brits have always been kind of sovereign.
===============================================

[BR]

PollyUSA – re yours at October 12, 2005 at 07:21 AM

How interesting that the David Cloud WSJ article is dated 10/17/03. The one that describes the contents of a classified INR memo. That's 11 days before Jeff Gannon's 3-part series interview of Wilson was published on 10/28/03. (Reprinted there after TalonNews.com went off line due to the furore over Gannon.)

So even though the WSJ's David Cloud was in possession of classified info as you pointed out, the Washington Post then chose to target Gannon instead, in their 12/26/03 WP article, charging that he along with other conservative news outlets were in possession of the still-classified INR document which described Plame's role in sending Wilson to Niger, implying the WH leaked it to conservative allies. I doubt the WSJ qualifies under that definition.

I believe this INR memo was part of a Trojan Horse setup by the CIA/Plame/INR cabal from the start, but had never seen the David Cloud article until you pointed it out above. Thank you! Another piece of the puzzle in the big picture : )

[kim]

Oh yes, BR, the aspens fascinate. And you can rhyme!
============================================