We commented earlier on the political forces buffeting the CIA: House and Senate committees are examining pre-war intelligence, wondering where the WMDs are; the State Dept intelligence unit disputes the CIA account of a trailer as a mobile bio-weapons lab; and the White House is accused of politicizing intelligence.
On that last bit, the CIA prepares a semi-annual on the pursuit of WMDs by various countries. Here we have the June 2000 and June 2002 reports.
Now, one of the criticisms of the CIA was that it annoyed the State Dept by being a hawk on Iraqi chemical and biological programs, and annoyed the neocons by being a dove on Iraqi nuclear ambitions. If we can safely assume that the evil neocon influence was absent from the June 2000 report, the transition is interesting, and seems to square with the criticism:
June 2000, on Chemical weapons:
...Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities. It has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes...
June 2002:
...Chemical: We believe that, since December 1998, Iraq has increased its capability to pursue chemical warfare (CW) programs. After both the Gulf war and Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Iraq rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as former dual-use CW production facilities and missile production facilities. Iraq has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use...
June 2000, Biological:
In 1995, Iraq admitted to having an offensive BW program and submitted the first in a series of Full, Final, and Complete Disclosures (FFCDs) that were supposed to reveal the full scope of its BW program. According to UNSCOM, these disclosures are incomplete and filled with inaccuracies. Since the full scope and nature of Iraq's BW program was not verified, UNSCOM assessed that Iraq continues to maintain a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time, if needed. .
June 2002, Biological:
Biological. During this reporting period, Baghdad continued to pursue a BW program. Iraq in 1995 admitted to having an offensive BW program, but UNSCOM was unable to verify the full scope and nature of Iraq's efforts. UNSCOM assessed that Iraq was maintaining a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time. In addition, Iraq has continued dual-use research that could improve BW agent R&D capabilities. In light of Iraq's growing industrial self-sufficiency and the availability of mobile or possible covert facilities, we are concerned that Iraq is again producing BW agents.
Not a big change, IMHO. Now, let's go nuclear:
June 2000 (and we note that this appears down in the list):
We believe that Iraq has probably continued low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq's most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon.
June 2002, with "Nuclear" the first thing mentioned:
Nuclear. More than ten years of sanctions and the loss of much of Iraq's physical nuclear infrastructure under IAEA oversight have not diminished Saddam's interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Iraq's efforts to procure tens of thousands of proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.
Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that focused on building an implosion-type weapon using highly enriched uranium. Baghdad was attempting a variety of uranium enrichment techniques, the most successful of which were the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge programs. After its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq initiated a crash program to divert IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet- and French-supplied reactors, but the onset of hostilities ended this effort. Iraqi declarations and the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process revealed much of Iraq's nuclear weapons efforts.
Baghdad, however, still has not provided complete information on all aspects of its nuclear weapons program. Iraq has withheld significant details relevant to its nuclear program, including procurement logs, technical documents, experimental data, accounting of materials, and foreign assistance. Baghdad also continues to withhold other data about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraqi security services in concealing its nuclear facilities and activities. In recent years, Baghdad has diverted goods contracted under the Oil-for-Food Program for military purposes and has increased solicitations and dual-use procurements—outside the Oil-for-Food process—some of which almost certainly are going to prohibited WMD and other weapons programs. Baghdad probably uses some of the money it gains through its illicit oil sales to support its WMD efforts.
Before its departure from Iraq, the IAEA made significant strides toward dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons program and unearthing the nature and scope of Iraq's past nuclear activities. In the absence of inspections, however, most analysts assess that Iraq is working to reconstitute its nuclear program—unraveling the IAEA's hard-earned accomplishments.
Iraq retained its cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians, its program documentation, and sufficient dual-use manufacturing capabilities to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi media have reported numerous meetings between Saddam and nuclear scientists over the past two years, signaling Baghdad's continuing interest in reviving a nuclear program.
Iraq's expanding international trade provided growing access to nuclear-related technology and materials and potential access to foreign nuclear expertise. An increase in dual-use procurement activity in recent years may be supporting a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. The acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq's principal hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon. Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear device until the last half of this decade. Baghdad could produce a nuclear weapon within a year if it were able to procure weapons-grade fissile material abroad.
Emphasis added to the controversial aluminum tubes.
If "more words" equals "more important", then clearly the CIA was taking the nuclear threat more seriously.
As to content, however, this seems like pretty thin soup - Saddam is a bad guy, who tried for nukes before, and might again... gee, thanks. One wonders what lies a Senator might think he (or she) was told. Although, of course, this is the de-classified version.
MORE: Let's pick on Sen. Kerry - here is his Senate floor speech from Oct. 2002. My brief point? He does not frame the WMD question as "based on recent intelligence, I have been reluctantly forced to conclude that...". Rather, his position is, "I have been saying since 1998 that Saddam is a threat we need to resolve".
MORE: Link to Sy Hersh's New Yorker piece.
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