From the new 9/11 Commisison staff report on the FBI:
p.4 - The Department of Justice Inspector General found that when the FBI designated “national and economic security” as its top priority in 1998, it did not shift its human resources accordingly. Although the FBI’s counterterrorism budget tripled during the mid-1990s, FBI counterterrorism spending remained fairly constant between fiscal years 1998 and 2001. The Inspector General’s 2003 report stated that prior to 9/11, “the Bureau devoted significantly more special agent resources to traditional law enforcement
activities such as white collar crime, organized crime, drug, and violent crime investigations than to domestic and international terrorism issues.” According to another external review of the FBI, by 2000 there were twice as many agents devoted to drug enforcement matters as to counterterrorism. On September 11, 2001, only about 1,300 agents, or six percent of the FBI’s total personnel, worked on counterterrorism.
Someone will dig up a clarion call for equal treament of crime in the suites and crime in the streets. And the anti-drug-warriors will be heard from.
Nor did the FBI receive all it requested from the Department of Justice, under Attorney General Janet
Reno.
During the era when Clinton had no higher priority than terror, if we can believe Richard Clarke.
Excerpts continue.
The second core challenge was a legal issue that became a management challenge as well. Certain provisions of federal law had been interpreted to limit communication between agents conducting intelligence investigations and the criminal prosecution units of the Department of Justice. This was done so that the broad powers for gathering intelligence would not be seized upon by prosecutors trying to make a criminal case. The separation of intelligence from criminal investigations became known as the “wall.”
We want Glenn on that "wall".
Despite additional guidance on information sharing issued by Attorney General Reno in February 2000 and by Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson in August 2001, the wall remained a source of considerable frustration and concern within the Justice Department.
Oxygen for Bush/Ashcroft/Rice.
p. 5 - Attempts at Reform
The 1998 Strategic Plan. The FBI issued a five-year strategic plan in May 1998 that was
spearheaded by Deputy Director Robert Bryant....
Drift into debacle.
The Investigative Services Division also was intended to increase the professional stature
of analysts. An internal review of the FBI’s intelligence analysis function at this time [1999] found that 66 percent of the Bureau’s analysts were not qualified to perform analytical duties. The review made recommendations for improvements. It appears that these recommendations were either not implemented or not enforced.
Skipping forward:
p. 6 - Watson thought the FBI had to step up to a major choice of mission, perhaps turning over a significant share of narcotics enforcement to the DEA in order to free up resources for countering terrorism. Although he thought FBI Director Freeh was sympathetic, most FBI managers opposed such a fundamental change before 9/11 and none of the pre-9/11 budgets made that choice.
Aaaagh.
The FBI’s new counterterrorism strategy was not a focus of the Justice Department in 2001. Attorney General Ashcroft told us that upon his arrival at the Department, he faced a number of challenges that signaled the need for reform at the FBI. He mentioned the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents, the Wen Ho Lee investigation, FBI agent Robert Hanssen’s espionage, the late discovery of FBI documents related to the Timothy McVeigh case, and public disclosures about lost laptops and firearms.
Ruby Ridge and Waco? The usual suspects will howl at this. They will howl at this next bit, too:
On May 9, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft testified at a hearing on U.S. federal efforts to combat terrorism. He testified that the Justice Department had no higher priority than to protect citizens from
terrorist attacks.
On May 10, 2001, the Department issued guidance for developing the fiscal year 2003 budget that made reducing the incidence of gun violence and reducing the trafficking of illegal drugs priority objectives. Watson told us that he almost fell out of his chair when he saw the memo, because it made no mention of counterterrorism.
More on structural problems, p. 7 and following:
Intelligence Collection
Intelligence collection efforts should begin with a strategy to comprehend what is being collected, identify the gaps, and push efforts toward meeting requirements identified by strategic analysis. Prior to 9/11 the FBI did not have a process in place to effectively manage its intelligence collection efforts. It did not identify intelligence gaps.
Strategic Analysis
It is the role of the strategic analyst to look across individual operations and cases to identify trends in terrorist activity and develop broad assessments of the terrorist threat to U.S. interests. The goal is not abstract. Such analysis drives collection efforts. It is the only way to evaluate what the institution does not know. The FBI had little understanding of, or appreciation for, the role of strategic analysis in driving
investigations or allocating resources.
...In short, analysts didn’t know what they didn’t know.
Knowledge Management
Prior to 9/11, the FBI did not have an adequate ability to know what it knew. In other words, the FBI did not have an effective mechanism for capturing or sharing its institutional knowledge. FBI agents did create records of interviews and other investigative efforts, but there were no reports officers to condense the information into meaningful intelligence that could be retrieved and disseminated.
Now, did the FBI play well with others?
We were told that at headquarters, information sharing between the FBI and CIA improved greatly when the agencies began exchanging senior counterterrorism officials in 1996.
...The FBI’s inability or unwillingness to share information reportedly frustrated White House national security officials. According to former National Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke, the National Security Council never received anything in writing from the FBI whatsoever. Former Deputy National Security Adviser James Steinberg stated that the only time that the FBI provided the National Security Council with relevant information was during the Millennium crisis. Clarke told us that Attorney General Reno was notified that the National Security Council could not run an effective counterterrorism program without access to FBI information.
The Justice Department representative on Clarke’s interagency group, the Counterterrorism and Security Group, has told us, however, that—to his knowledge— neither Clarke nor anyone else at the NSC raised any systemic issue of FBI information sharing as a policy issue or a matter to be considered by the Attorney General. Reno, in any case, initiated biweekly briefings of National Security Adviser Samuel Berger with
FBI Director Freeh.
In the Clarke-Rice smackdown, this may score heavily against Clarke, who should have emphasized to Ms. Rice that the FBI had problems. But we may score it against Ms. Rice anyway, since she could have uncovered this problem with about three questions.
Finally, from the conclusion:
The FBI attempted several reform efforts aimed at strengthening its ability to prevent such attacks, but these reform efforts failed to effect change organizationwide. -- On September 11, 2001, the FBI was limited in several areas critical to an effective, preventive counterterrorism strategy. Those working counterterrorism matters did so despite limited intelligence collection and strategic analysis capabilities, a limited capacity to share information both internally and externally, insufficient training, an overly complex legal regime, and inadequate resources.
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