Proliferation Of A Bum Non-Proliferation Meme

[UPDATE 2: Reporters report - Matt gets the source of the confusion on the phone, and splits the difference. Good job.]

[UPDATE: A gracious acknowledgement from Matt. I often say good things about him, and its easy to see why.

MORE: Mark Kleiman steps up as well.]

Matt Yglesias (who is having some week), gets taken in by a bum Economist story. And from a look at his trackbacks, we see that the meme he has launched has found an audience.

Matt's gist - the "Bush administration was scuttling the verification component of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

... The current issue of the Economist has a seriously buried lede explaining that the main motivation was, in fact, "the worries of Israel and Pakistan, two allies that want to keep the option of adding to their stockpiles." We scuttled a treaty that will keep bombs out of the hands of terrorists so that Israel and Pakistan (!) can build bigger arsenals? Israel and Pakistan!

Mark Kleiman joins in, wondering whether this is the high price being paid as part of a deal to nab Osama before the election.

Fine, as polemics - I can see why Dems will want to argue that the price for the capture of Osama was too high, and made our country less safe. And since Mr. Kleiman reminds us of Bush's comment that we cannot win the war on terror without mentioning Bush's subsequent back-pedaling, I think we can assume that his post is intended as point-scoring without content.

So back to the Economist - what did they really say about Pakistan in their "buried lede"? Here we go:

Daryl Kimball, of the Arms Control Association, argues that a properly focused treaty could be monitored with confidence. He puts the reversal of past American policy by the Bush team down to three less high-minded motives: their aversion to multilateral agreements; the worries of Israel and Pakistan, two allies that want to keep the option of adding to their stockpiles; and opposition from the navy, which doesn't want inspectors snooping around to make sure that nuclear fuel for powering submarines is not diverted to power warheads.

From this, Matt plausibly concludes that "We scuttled a treaty that will keep bombs out of the hands of terrorists so that Israel and Pakistan (!) can build bigger arsenals? ...Apparently so.

Well, as I said, it was a bum Economist article, so let's not pounce on Matt (yet). Here is what Daryl Kimball, of the Arms Control Association actually wrote:

So, what is really behind the reluctance to negotiate an effectively verifiable FMCT? The policy is yet another symptom of this administration’s strong allergy to multilateral arms control. It also reflects the Bush administration’s insufficient regard for the effect of Israel’s and Pakistan’s unregulated nuclear weapons programs on regional security and nonproliferation objectives. Pressing forward with a verifiable FMCT would help bring those states, along with India, into the nonproliferation mainstream and enhance efforts to ensure that other states comply with their treaty obligations.

Wait a second! Somehow we have drifted from underestimating the danger of the Pakistani and Israeli programs, in the Kimball formulation, to scuttling the treaty in order to accomodate them, by the time we get to Matt Yglesias. I think the Economist made most of that leap, and I can't see how they justify it. Look, if I read that Bill Clinton ate Big Macs in disregard of the cholesterol risk, and then report that Bill Clinton ate Big Macs in order to boost his cholesterol, I have gone awry. Normally the Economist is pretty good, so what happened here? I have no idea.

But with that clarification, Matt's argument begins to unravel. We didn't scuttle the treaty so that Pakistan could build their arsenal; at worst, an increased Pakistani arsenal is an undesired consequence of our pursuit of other goals.

However, a bit of research indicates that there was no treaty to scuttle - this has been in talks for years, and the US believed (rightly or wrongly) that the verification objectives were technically unfeasible, harmed our national security, and would not be accepted by the rest of the world once they studied the price tag.

What we seem to have scuttled was an opportunity to debate for years without agreeing to anything; what we have proposed is a slimmed down treaty that might actually be acceptable to others.

Or not. But that is the Admin spin, anyway.

We can smite Matt for some other things. He says this:

The Treaty would, if properly enforced, damage US interests not at all while making it harder for terrorists and rogue states to acquire nuclear weapons. The administration's official line on why they'd done this -- that it was too expensive -- seemed to seriously call into question their sanity. Verification may be expensive, but it could hardly be too expensive to reduce the single greatest security threat facing the nation.

Even the Economist got this right, although they hid it a bit - the oficial US position is not that verification is too expensive for the United States, but rather that other countries will object, if they ever get around to figuring out the price tag. From the Economist:

An 18-month review, say officials close to the exercise, showed that it would cost more money to verify such a treaty than anyone is likely to want to pay...

...administration officials deny that their judgment on verifiability was made on anything other than technical grounds. No other country, they argue, has undertaken a similar systematic review. And they point out that the only difference between production of highly-enriched uranium for civilian purposes and for making bombs is one of intent. That is something inspectors cannot be expected to verify—as the current wrangle over Iran's true nuclear ambitions shows. In any case, governments could still agree on transparency and confidence-building measures to show they are keeping their commitment.

OK, that is a bit cryptic, so one might miss their meaning. However, googling on "Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty" does not produce a burdensome number of news stories; this one by Wade Boese of the Arms Control Association presents the issue more clearly:

A July 29 statement released by the Bush administration also shed some light on the thinking behind the policy shift. “Effective verification of an FMCT would require an inspection regime so extensive that it could compromise key signatories’ core national security interests and so costly that many countries will be hesitant to accept it,” the statement noted.

Now, maybe that is not an accurate assessment of the will of the international community, but it is different from what Matt is saying. Because this also cites national security considerations (we don't want other countries learning the secrets of our nuclear program) it also contradicts (as does the Economist) Matt's blithe assertion that this treaty would "damage US interests not at all".

Let me note the good news - Strobe Talbott, a member of the Kerry foreign policy brain trust, was deeply involved the India-Pakistan conflict of 1999, so he is a bit of an expert on these issues. As I have said before, it is all about Kashmir - people need to get over the notion that, because we have a problem with Osama, Pakistan ought to hop to. I will extract this from Matt's post as emblematic of this Ameri-centric logic:

If we really must choose between a serious Pakistani anti-proliferation effort and a serious Pakistani effort to get bin Laden, I'll take bin Laden running free without a nuke over bin Laden dead and his successor running around with a nuke.

OK, I note the "if" - this is not a real choice, so the rest of his post (and Kleiman's) is rhetoric.

Briefly - India measures itself against China, and wants nukes; Pakistan worries about India, and wants nukes. The US can argue all it wants for non-proliferation, but while India and Pakistan are at risk of war over Kashmir, both will be inclined to develop their nuclear capability. Osama is a side issue for them. In fact, the US is a side issue for them. Countries like Germany and Japan did not go nuclear during the Cold War because they accepted the US nuclear umbrella. Should the US extend such a guarantee to Pakistan or India? No, I am not serious.

Other points about the FMCT are made by the Bushies - they may be wrong, but I have not seen a compelling rebuttal. From the Boese article:

The U.S. position, the official explained, is that, regardless of the verification measures agreed to, an FMCT is not able to be “effectively verifiable.” Hence, the United States wants to remove that language from the 1995 Shannon mandate.

Look, if verification is technically impossible (the Economist mentions the enriched uranium reactors for commercial power, which can be converted to produce weapons, as in Iran), then insisting on it is hopeless. This is reminiscent of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty debacle in 1999, where we have two sides to a complicated technical question, and a spirit of calm bi-partisanship seems to be lacking.

More Bush rationales for dropping verification:

Another administration official interviewed Aug. 20 emphasized that the U.S. approach is motivated by wanting to establish a prohibition against the production of fissile material for weapons sooner rather than later. The concern is that negotiating a verification regime would prolong the talks by years, allowing countries currently producing fissile material without any restraints to continue to do so until a final agreement is reached.

India and Pakistan are believed still to be churning out fissile material for arms, while the status of Israel’s production activities is unclear.

Sounds like spin, but who knows?

“Effective verification of an FMCT would require an inspection regime so extensive that it could compromise key signatories’ core national security interests...

...For instance, the United States and other countries are opposed to providing access to facilities involved in providing nuclear fuel for their naval propulsion reactors.

Israel, which shrouds its nuclear activities in secrecy, made well known its concerns about an FMCT in 1998 when it decided not to block the conference from initiating negotiations on the accord. The talks disbanded after a few weeks without any progress. (See ACT, August/September 1998.)

Intrusive or expensive verification measures also are understood to be of concern to China, France, and Pakistan, although all have previously endorsed the goal of a verifiable FMCT.

So maybe some of these countries would negotiate endlessly and never sign anything. Anticipating this, we played the bad guy and dropped the verification bits. Maybe. Let's put this in the mix:

Some conference members, including key U.S. allies, swiftly made clear they do not share the U.S. perspective. Canada and Japan reiterated their long-standing support for the Shannon mandate and Australian Ambassador Michael Smith argued Aug. 12 that, “to be credible and effective, the FMCT should include appropriate verification arrangements.” British officials also have indicated that they favor verification measures.

Well, the US position, as noted in the Economist, seems to be that countries that don't want to cheat will have no trouble demonstrating their good intent:

In any case, governments could still agree on transparency and confidence-building measures to show they are keeping their commitment.

Let's close with a trip to Fantasy Island with Mr. Kimball:

The additional financial cost of expanding the scope of current nuclear inspections to cap the size of the world’s arsenals is well worth the price. As recent events in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea show, when international arms inspectors have the political and legal authority to visit relevant sites and investigate suspicious findings, they can detect and deter cheating and, if necessary, help mobilize international action against violators.

These are the success stories? He's kidding, right? I'll accept that the treaty process and the IAEA have helped, but I think they also illustrate the limitations of even the strongest pieces of paper.

UPDATE: Let me see if I can be crystal-clear. This debate is highly analogous to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty debate. In each case, the details are complicated and, in some cases, classified, and I have neither the time, the expertise, nor the security clearance to evaluate the different positions. Do I trust the conclusions drawn by the Bushies? Not really. Do I trust Strobe Talbott and the Kerry people? No, I think they would use this as one more opportunity for partisan point-scoring. Would I trust the Times, or Fox News? Please.

This takes me to the "Who do you trust" question, and the answer is, not many people or reporting institutions. That my be a sign of a personal problem on my part, but I think it is a symptom of a deeper problem in our political culture.

Comments

[jim jones]

Tom,

If you place their world view mindset then this is what the world looks like:

Well, North Korea was negociated by Jimmy Carter and Clinton's staff never found anything wrong while they were in power.

In the case of Iraq, Hans Blix says there was never any real issue in Iraq.

The EU assures us that with negociation, Iran will come into line.

In 2000, the great disaster happened and everything is Bush's fault, everything. there was no problem until he became president.

See, that was easy, wasn't it. Willing suspension of disbelief.

[Art Hippler]

Re the Economist:
Don't get carried away wondering why the Economist seems to be making peculiar hay out of the concern over nuclear proliferation. I've been following the "E" for 50 years. I have learned they are a good sorce for uncovering what the fuzzy, oftimes vaguely leftist but nervously anti-revolutionary, tired Brit intellectual thinks,(when he thinks). There are not a plethora of Margaret Thatchers there, but then we have only a few ourselves (of either sex).

[Art Hippler]

Re the Economist:
Don't get carried away wondering why the Economist seems to be making peculiar hay out of the concern over nuclear proliferation. I've been following the "E" for 50 years. I have learned they are a good sorce for uncovering what the fuzzy, oftimes vaguely leftist but nervously anti-revolutionary, tired Brit intellectual thinks,(when he thinks). There are not a plethora of Margaret Thatchers there, but then we have only a few ourselves (of either sex).

[topcat]

I thought it was Big Monicas not Big Macs.

[Reid]

Thank you so much for illuminating the issues here. People like Matt Yglesias just can't be bothered to. They're too important. And they just know... KNOW that the Bush administration is up to no good.

What a tool.

[John Kerry]

Almost no matter how much is spin and how much is not spin, the mere fact that the issue is as complicated as it turns out to be pretty much destroys Matt's point.

[christian]

I'm an Economist subscriber (i.e. I pay for all the articles online), but I stopped regulary reading it months ago.

There must be quite a few Idiotarians hiding behind the 'Economist' brand nowadays. (For an example: look who started the second intifada according to them and against evidence to the contrary)

And since it is the magazines policy to identify no writer, I'm disencouraged to trust any of their articles. (It's like Dowd and Safire would mark all their articles simply with 'NYT', as much as you might like the latter it's not worth risking massive illness in the morning.)

[Brent Michael Krupp]

Yeah, I'm with christian in the comment above, but I went one step further and actually cancelled my subscription a few months back. I'd read The Economist religiously for about 12 years but since 9/11 they started drifting closer and closer to the loony left. It's really sad to see a once great magazine become so unreadable.

[Brent Michael Krupp]

Yeah, I'm with christian in the comment above, but I went one step further and actually cancelled my subscription a few months back. I'd read The Economist religiously for about 12 years but since 9/11 they started drifting closer and closer to the loony left. It's really sad to see a once great magazine become so unreadable.

[Michael]

Minuteman, why haven't you sent trackbacks to Yglesias and Kleiman? Maybe they'd correct their posts if they were aware of your persuasive criticism.

[TM]

why haven't you sent trackbacks to Yglesias and Kleiman?

Hmm, you mean that doesn't just happen automaticly? I feel like the intelectual heir to Bill Gates if I can log on successfully in the morning.

UPDATE: I'll be darned -I try to learn something bew every day, but I think that may cover me for the week. Thanks.

[werner]

I have been a reader of the Economist since 1990. They used to be much better. If this goes on, they will end up as the "Guardian for Businessmen".

[Matthew Yglesias]

See correction on my site -- http://yglesias.typepad.com/matthew/2004/09/important_corre.html -- I would have posted it sooner if this post had been brought to my attention more swiftly. I found it through Brad Delong just a few minutes ago.

[abb1]

Almost no matter how much is spin and how much is not spin, the mere fact that the issue is as complicated as it turns out to be pretty much destroys Matt's point.

It's a very simple issue: verification, inspections. Plus tons of spin, smoke and mirrors (too expensive? you've gotta be kidding me) from the administration - a bunch of gangsters, really, who refuse to be treated like everyone else because they have a lot of big guns. And suddenly everything becomes sssooo complicated.

Haven't we seen this before: global warming - so very complicated, scientists disagree; does smoking really cause cancer? who knows, opinions differ.

This is foolish, snap out of it, fellas.

[Dean]

Is that all, abb 1? Gee, who knew?

Er, except:

What is the mechanism for verification? How much cheating is acceptable? (Please don't say "none," b/c that means no treaty is going to ever be acceptable. The question is, how far down are we likely to detect cheating.)

What is the mechanism for inspections? What are the likely safeguards to prevent inspections from being simply another term for espionage, be it for inteligence or economic purposes?

Who gets a say on inspections? Should Iran or North Korea have a say? On inspections of themselves? Other nations? (Remember, both Libya and Syria, iirc, have wound up on the UN Human Rights Commission of late, so this is hardly a far-out hypothetical.)

What happens if cheating is discovered? Do all the signatories go to war w/ the violator? Does the violator get another chance? How many more chances? What if they're like Iraq post-1990, and spin the whole thing out, month after month, year after year?

Things are often simple, when it's your decision but someone else's responsibility....

[Tom]

After all is said and done on nuclear deterrance, do you think the US under any president is going to seriously pare down our nuclear arsenal or cut back on our nuke testing?

Check out my wrap-up of both National Conventions I wrote today on my blog.

Tom

[Robert Waldmann]

Matthew Yglesias sure is gracious. In fact, I think he is too gracious to you. The Ecnomist paraphrase of Kimball is clearly their guess of what he thinks not a responsible paraphrase of what he said. Besides, what does Kimball know. If he had really said something identical to the Economist's paraphrase, we would only know that Kimball was speculating about Bush's motives.

The Economist's correspondant's guess as to what could possibly have made the Bush administration flip flop (for the hundredth time) seems plausible to me (mainly because it is identical to my own guess). I admit there is no evidence for it. However, I find the claims quoted by McGuire to amount to zero evidence that the Bush administration flopped for other reasons. If they were doing a favor for Israel and Pakistant, they would certainly make up some explanation. Frankly the arguments they give make me more suspicious than I was to begin with, since they are surprisingly implausible.

[abb1]

Dean,
The IAEA was created in 1957, almost 40 years ago. Verification mechanism has been in place for decades: inspectors, procedures, equipment, videocameras installed at nuclear powerplants, etc. There is no mystery in how to enforce it either: sanctions. This is a phony issue. The Bushies just blow smoke out of their ass (and, as usual, not even trying to make it credible) and you, guys, are playing the role of useful idiots.

Now, I agree, that taking care of the client states (Israel and Pakistan) is only a part of the reason; the main reason is their arrogance: they just don't want to play by the same rules as everybody else. They are, after all, the masters of the universe, it's their New American Century - why would they submit to inspections? They are above the law. That's the main reason no international agreement on anything is possible these days.

[Crank]

Tom - I've been meaning to blog the point in your last paragraph - this is a persistent problem with reading Yglesias in particular, who loves to cite to sources that can't be fact-checked to claim that, in fact, none of the things the Bush Administration says it is doing are actually happening. I'm sure he's sometimes right about that, but how can you tell? It's always a problem when policy debates depend on the resolution of factual questions that evade the capabilities of concerned citizens.

[Cecil Turner]

"There is no mystery in how to enforce it either: sanctions."

[Snort] You can't be serious. Another decade of watching dictators and their minions grow richer and more powerful by manipulating corrupt UN sanctions programs? While human rights organizations claim they kill hundreds of thousands of children? No thanks.

"That's the main reason no international agreement on anything is possible these days."

Ooooh, the horror. As if the world's safety depends on passing another feel-good treaty for rogue regimes to ignore. (Or worse, one--like The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention--that actively encourages cheating and sparks a secret WMD arms race.) The contention that new international agreements are necessarily a good thing is at best arguable. In any event, the main problem with new international agreements is that many nations view them as a means for reining in US power, and negotiate accordingly. The resulting treaties (e.g., Kyoto, ICC) are detrimental to US interests, and (deservedly) have zero chance of US ratification.

[abb1]

In any event, the main problem with new international agreements is that many nations view them as a means for reining in US power, and negotiate accordingly.

I am sure it's a part of it, but why is it "the main problem" all of a sudden? You have to give some get some and the US has the most to give as well as to get. If it keeps bullying instead of trying to find the common ground, something very unpleasant will eventually happen and we'll have no one to blame but ourselves.

[Cecil Turner]

"I am sure it's a part of it, but why is it "the main problem" all of a sudden?"

If the goal is to create a treaty the US will ratify, provisions inimical to US interests are an obvious problem. Since we agree on that point, I won't insist on the word "main."

"You have to give some get some and the US has the most to give as well as to get. If it keeps bullying instead of trying to find the common ground, something very unpleasant will eventually happen and we'll have no one to blame but ourselves."

Again, this assumes a treaty is necessarily good. In fact, a bad treaty is worse than none at all, and Kyoto is a perfect example. Russian Academy of Science head Kirill Kondratiev summed it up nicely:

"The only people who would be hurt by abandoning the Kyoto Protocol would be several thousand people who make a living attending conferences on global warming."

Similarly, arms control agreements that merely provide cover for nations to pursue WMD arsenals are counterproductive. The 1972 BWC is an extreme example, providing the Soviets and Iraq an incentive to develop bio weapons while US defense programs stalled. The 1994 Agreed Framework didn't halt the North Korean nuclear program; it underscored the fact that a viable program was a useful bargaining chip and provided an incentive to maintain it.

The same people who brought us the 1972 BWC treaty (and the latter attempt to tack on an unworkable enforcement scheme) and the badly broken Nuclear Non-Proliferation Pact, now assure us that elaborate inspections of US nuclear facilities are essential to ensure fissile material isn't produced in, say, Pakistan. Considering the recent discovery of (admittedly inept) hidden nuclear laboratories in Libya, the problem with undeclared covert production facilities should be obvious--as is the point that inspections that never visit the hidden site are useless. Excuse me if I'm less than exuberant over the prospects of passing this one.

[abb1]

Sorry Cecil, but this sounds like weak spin and a bunch of nonsense all around.

Why should I listen to what Kirill Kondratiev said? It means nothing to me, less than nothing, in fact.

The 1994 Agreed Framework certainly did prevent North Korea from using plutonium for making nukes - until it was abandoned by the Bushies.

NPT certainly did slow down proliferation.

Best is the enemy of the good. Nothing in life is perfect. An imperfect disarmament treaty is certainly better than no treaty at all, unless it's extraordinary bad. But even if it is extraordinary bad, you work to improve it, you don't say: "oh, it's not perfect, so let's call the whole thing off."

Try again.

[Greg F]

abba1,

For starters the N. Koreans abandoned the 1994 Framework, not the “Bushies”. Since the agreement power has passed to Kim Jung Il, from his father, who is arguably missing some screws (the son that is). There is no question N. Korea had been pursuing a nuclear weapons program throughout the 90’s, although somewhat constrained by the 94 agreement. It was only a mater of time before the above mentioned nut case would withdraw from the 94 Framework to put the finishing touches on his nuclear weapons program.

[Cecil Turner]

Why should I listen to what Kirill Kondratiev said?

Oh, I don't know. Maybe because he leads the most prestigious academy of science without a dog in this particular fight? Do you find a 95-0 Senate vote more compelling? How do you define a bad treaty?

An imperfect disarmament treaty is certainly better than no treaty at all, unless it's extraordinary bad.

"Certainly" better, eh? The 1972 BWC actually increased the Soviets' bio weapons efforts. The DPRK continued their nuke program throughout the life of the 1994 Agreed Framework while we provided them oil supplies, much of which went to support their military. Do those qualify as "extraordinary bad"? How about the ABM treaty (which the Soviets cheated on) or the Washington Naval treaty (which the Japanese cheated on)--both of which resulted in a tactical advantage for our adversaries--one of which resulted in a naval imbalance that promoted adventurism and resulted in the deaths of many American sailors? Were those better than no treaty at all? Obviously this is an article of faith. Good luck getting one of your gospels ratified.

[abb1]

Greg,
It is my understanding that the US reneged on the framework agreement first. As far as certain world leaders being nutcases - let's not go there.

Cecil,
because he leads the most prestigious academy of science without a dog in this particular fight
Their scientists probably are good, but why should I listen to a bureaucrat who is probably nothing more than a mouthpiece for Putin?

Do those qualify as "extraordinary bad"?
I am not familiar with the story of 1972 treaty you mentioned; if you post a link to a neutral source I'll read it.

1994 framework agreement with N.Korea was a very positive treaty in my opinion, your rhetoric notwithstanding. I'd classify it as "the best possible, much better than what we have now".

Again, your whole premise seems so weird: people cheat on taxes - so, should we abolish the tax system? People manage to commit crimes and get away with it - does it mean that the whole criminal justice system is a bad idea?

Clearly an imperfect treaty is much better than perfect arms race.

Thanks.

[Greg F]

abb1,

You state:
It is my understanding that the US reneged on the framework agreement first.

Well that is N. Korea’s assertion and if I read you correctly you believe it is the “Bushies” fault. Would you care to provide proof for this assertion?

[Cecil Turner]

"It is my understanding that the US reneged on the framework agreement first."

No. By the time the DPRK admitted they had an ongoing uranium enrichment program, they also claimed to be close to weapons assembly. It was obvious at that point they had never ceased WMD development efforts (nor intended to). A good overview is available here.

"1994 framework agreement with N.Korea was a very positive treaty in my opinion . . ."

If you believe they actually stopped weapons development in 1994, I can see how you'd think that. But they obviously didn't. The only practical effect was to keep the story off the front pages while they worked feverishly on developing nuclear weapons. How you can call that "positive" is beyond me.

"I am not familiar with the story of 1972 treaty you mentioned; if you post a link to a neutral source I'll read it."

Not being familiar with the BWC (or the CWC, or the NNPT) affects the weight most would give to opinions on disarmament treaties. And I'm not sure there's such a thing as a neutral source . . . obviously those in the business of negotiating treaties have a huge stake in the outcome. But here is a compilation of various news items about the treaty. You have to read through the diplomatic language a bit, but for example here, the Russians promise to dismantle their offensive bioweapons program (about 20 years late). The State Department commentary is on point:

"We've known for many years that the Soviet Union maintained an offensive biological weapons program in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention," spokesman Richard Boucher told a news briefing. Since 1984, the United States has reported that fact annually to Congress and the American public."

It's also worth pointing out that the FAS is rabidly pro-disarmament. For a more critical view, try the WSJ:

But of course, the Soviet scientists were lying. Sverdlovsk was precisely what the CIA and arms-control skeptics had argued, a ghastly bioweapons accident in a program that blatantly violated the treaty. Mr. Meselson admitted this in a 1994 article in Science magazine, notable for omission of any hint of mea culpa.

or various columnists (e.g. Mona Charen):

Nor is it the case that treaties and conventions enhance our security, collective or individual. The old Soviet Union and Iraq both happily signed the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and then proceeded to fill huge vats with smallpox, anthrax and other pathogens. The signing of treaties makes for lovely ceremonies. But they are for the weak-minded--and the complacent.

That last may be a bit harsh . . . but it's hard to see how signing an unverifiable treaty with a regime that has a track record of reneging on its agreements makes us any safer. And dismissing valid verification concerns as "spin" is a good indication of someone who doesn't take the issue seriously.