In the course of preparing a rousing something or other about something or other, I was reminded of this excerpt from Woodward's last book:
Within the CIA's Near East Division, which handled some of the hardest, most violent countries, the Iraqi Operations Group was referred to as "The House of Broken Toys." It was largely populated with new, green officers and problem officers, or old boys waiting for retirement. After taking it over in August 2001, Saul had begun a full review of where the CIA stood with Iraq.
And you know where I am going because you know me too well! Let's reprise Valerie Plame's resume as presented by David Corn:
In 1997 she returned to CIA headquarters and joined the Counterproliferation Division. (About this time, she moved in with Joseph Wilson; they later married.) She was eventually given a choice: North Korea or Iraq. She selected the latter. Come the spring of 2001, she was in the CPD's modest Iraq branch. But that summer--before 9/11--word came down from the brass: We're ramping up on Iraq. Her unit was expanded and renamed the Joint Task Force on Iraq. Within months of 9/11, the JTFI grew to fifty or so employees. Valerie Wilson was placed in charge of its operations group.
So Ms. Plame was sitting in the Hosue of Broken Toys (more commonly known as "The Island of Misfit Toys") when she was swept up in the Iraqi exercise. I wonder which she was - green (naah!), a problem (?), or "waiting for retirement"? Twenty and out!
If Woodward's description of the group's expertise and status is accurate, my question is how on earth could that have been the case from 1991 onward? Regardless of what it tells us about Plame, what does it tell us about the CIA itself?
Posted by: Other Tom | October 01, 2006 at 10:07 AM
And you know where I am going because you know me too well!
I don't think even the uninitiated would need an abacus to add that one up.
Regardless of what it tells us about Plame, what does it tell us about the CIA itself?
Dunno, but it ain't good. And it'd seem to reinforce the lesson of Scary Larry and the VIPS bubbas.
Posted by: Cecil Turner | October 01, 2006 at 10:17 AM
Are you saying that the Near East Division and the CPD for Iraq are the same organization. It sounds more like a matrixed structure where one division collaborates with another on a specific program. Typically these divisions would be run by different heads and have different political influences, different goals, and different levels of capabilities.
Just a thought.
Posted by: sammy small | October 01, 2006 at 10:22 AM
I have the same question as Sammy Small. Is Woodward's "Iraqi Operations Group" of the Near East Divison the same as Corn's "operations group" of the Joint Task Force on Iraq? It's hard to tell. Either way, that outfit has been a useless puzzle palace from top to bottom for a long, long time.
Posted by: Other Tom | October 01, 2006 at 10:31 AM
Other Tom,
Let's hope Woodward can still Astral Travel into the mind of Bill Casey so we can get an answer to your question.
Posted by: Art Bell | October 01, 2006 at 10:48 AM
Is Woodward's "Iraqi Operations Group" of the Near East Divison the same as Corn's "operations group" of the Joint Task Force on Iraq? It's hard to tell.
I'd guess not. Per the SSCI:
and Looks to me like the Near East Division and CPD are subordinate to DO, but distinct, and JTFI was formed from the latter. (Though the "joint" part of the descriptor suggests some overlap with other divisions/agencies.) But also from the SSCI's description, it appears the Iraq Operations Group was focused on more general issues, not primarily counterproliferation.Posted by: Cecil Turner | October 01, 2006 at 10:53 AM
So we went to war based on the work of "The Island of Misfit Toys" ?
Posted by: Neo | October 01, 2006 at 01:50 PM
"Saul" from Woodward and "Luis" in Corn's
book, seem to be the same person; I mean
how many Cuban Americans ,can be section
chief on Iraq, in the CIA. There was yet
another CIA memoir, that didn't name him, but described his position. Susskind, identifies Plame's boss as former Beijing
and Moscow station chief Rolfe Larsen, take
that with a grain of salt.
Posted by: narciso | October 01, 2006 at 07:52 PM
Does Corn intentionally forget this part of her resume? Page 39, SSCI.
Rohn's notes in the INR Memo tell us the trip was related to uranium.
Corn writes, "Come the spring of 2001, she was in the CPD's modest Iraq branch. But that summer--before 9/11--word came down from the brass: We're ramping up on Iraq."
Interesting that that coincides with the first reports of tubes. Page 88, SSCI.
Posted by: Rocco | October 02, 2006 at 07:02 PM
While Kerry's foibles have been well-documented, Harris and Halperin propose that the man most responsible for the Massachusetts senator's defeat was not the candidate but rather Matt Drudge -- founder of the widely read Drudge Report.
Harris and Halperin call Drudge the "single most influential purveyor of information about American politics" and go on to add: "Drudge, with his droll Dickensian name, was not the only media or political agent whose actions led to John Kerry's defeat. But his role placed him at the center of the game -- a New Media World Order in which Drudge was the most potent player in the process and a personifications of the dynamic that did Kerry in."
So why does Kerry keep blattering about "swiftboating" ?
Posted by: Neo | October 04, 2006 at 09:52 PM