Peter Baker of the NY Times ponders possible alternatives to the Biden/Trump framing of Afghanistan as a choice between full withdrawal or significant escalation. Sure, to (mis)quote a genius SecState, at this point what difference does it make? But this factoid suggests the unpopular stalemate was achieving some US national security goals with a low level of casualties:
After drawdowns beginning under Mr. Obama, just a fraction of the troops there at the peak were left, yet military strategists said they had an outsize impact in keeping Afghan security forces in the fight without engaging in as much combat themselves.
Fewer than 100 American troops died in combat in Afghanistan over the past five years, roughly the equivalent of the number of Americans currently dying from Covid-19 every two hours. Until the devastating attack this week by ISIS-K at the Kabul airport killed 13 American service members, the military had suffered no combat deaths since the Trump agreement was signed.
Yes, 100 deaths is 100 too many if no purpose is being served. But 5,000 US troops and associated air support were apparently a huge force multiplier propping up an Afghan army with dubious morale.
“The administration is presenting the choices in a way that is, at best, incomplete,” said Meghan O’Sullivan, a deputy national security adviser under President George W. Bush who oversaw earlier stages of the Afghan war. “No one I knew was advocating the return of tens of thousands of Americans into ‘open combat’ with the Taliban.”
Instead, some, including the current military leadership of Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III and Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserted that keeping a relatively modest force of as few as 3,000 to 4,500 troops along with the extensive use of drones and close air support could have enabled Afghan security forces to continue holding off the Taliban without putting Americans at much risk.
“There was an alternative that could have prevented further erosion and likely enabled us to roll back some of the Taliban gains in recent years,” said Gen. David H. Petraeus, the retired commander of American forces in Afghanistan and former C.I.A. director who argued the mission was making progress while serving alongside Mr. Biden under President Barack Obama.
If memory serves (and it does), the idea of a light US footprint focused on counter-terrorism rather than counterinsurgency was Biden's plan back in 2009. Met with derision at the time, maybe it doesn't looks so bad now.
Seems like a shame to skip the derision from 2009:
And others, more harshly, argue that Mr. Biden’s judgment on foreign policy has often been off base.
They point out that he voted against the successful Persian Gulf war of 1991, voted for the Iraq invasion of 2003, proposed dividing Iraq into three sections in 2006 and opposed the additional troops credited by many with turning Iraq around in 2007.
“When was the last time Biden was right about anything?” Thomas E. Ricks, a military writer, wrote in a blog on Sept. 24. Mr. Ricks is affiliated with the Center for a New American Security, a research organization founded by Democrats.
Mr. Biden’s advisers also considered extending the withdrawal deadline until the winter, after the traditional fighting season was over, to make the transition less dangerous for the Afghan government. The Afghanistan Study Group, a bipartisan congressionally chartered panel that was led by Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., a retired Joint Chiefs chairman and that included Ms. O’Sullivan, in February recommended extending the May 1 deadline and seeking better conditions before pulling out.
But Mr. Biden was warned by security specialists that the longer it took to withdraw after a decision was announced, the more dangerous it would become, aides said, so he extended it only until Aug. 31.
Some say none of this would have happened if Biden were still alive.
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